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The commander on the modern battlefield has the
responsibility of supervising more assets and evaluating more
information than ever before. Therefore, there exists a need
for an aid to assist the commander in selecting a recommended
course of action. The purpose of this thesis was to develop
a tactical decision aid model that would assist the commander
in selecting a course of action.
The Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) served as the
algorithm in this decision aid model. The QJM is a combat
model that analyzes ground combat with a primary focus on the
historical aspect of combat. Factors that served as input for
the decision aid model included:
1. initial force structure for a US and Soviet force,
2. non tactical variables that influence the battle,
3. intelligence,
4. operational and environmental factors, and
5. current doctrine.
The model varied the input variables and determined a force
structure necessary for the battle to end in a draw. The
primary focus of this thesis was not the assumptions made in
the model or the tactical situation examined, but the







The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While every effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
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One of the major problems with the majority of the land
combat models currently used is that they are constructed
using game theory and estimates of weapon systems' capabili-
ties. Colonel T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army (retired), realized this
problem and developed the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM)
which analyses ground combat focussing primarily on historical
lessons learned. Dupuy stated that if enough reliable data
could be collected from military history, it should provide
basic insights into the nature of the conflict and indicate
possible trends in planning for the future. [Ref 1, page xxi]
Many distinguished military leaders both past and present
share the same views as Dupuy on the value of military
history. Admiral Hyman Rickover wrote: "A page of history
is worth a book of logic." Dupuy states that since military
science is unable to test its theories in a laboratory, the
laboratory for the soldier is military history. [Ref 1, page
xxii]
B. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS
The combat power of a force considers the strength of the
force, any operational and environmental factors that may have
an impact on the force, and the quality of the troops. Many
tacticians believe that in order for the attacker to be
successful in battle, the attacker must possess a three-to-
one combat power superiority over the defender. There are,
however, countless examples throughout history that contradict
this doctrine.
General Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign of
1852 is an example that does not conform to the three-to-one
combat power superiority theory. Major General Nathaniel P.
Banks of the Union Army remained in the Shenandoah Valley to
prevent the Confederate Army from attacking Washington. The
Union forces totaled about 18,000 men, while the Confederates
under the command of Jackson numbered about 8,500 men.
Jackson's major objectives were to keep the Shenandoah Valley
from falling into the hands of the Union Army and to prevent
Banks from providing logistical support to General McClellan
and the Army of the Potomac.
In most of the battles during a two and a half month
period, Jackson's forces were successful. Eventually, Banks
received reinforcements that gave the Union Army an almost
four-to-one combat power superiority over the attacking
Confederates. The major contributing factor to Jackson's
success was that each time Banks received reinforcements
Jackson would prevent the reinforcements from joining the
parent unit. This made it extremely difficult for Banks to
establish a unified command of his entire force. [Ref 4]
General Robert E. Lee's attack against the forces of Major
General Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville is another example
which suggests that combat power is not the only factor which
determines the outcome of a battle. The Confederate forces
under the command of Lee had a force of about 61,000 men and
170 artillery pieces compared with a force of about 134,000
men and 4 04 artillery pieces in the Union Army. The key to
the Confederate Army's success was the quality and experience
of the leadership. [Ref 5] Other examples abound in history
that contradict the three-to-one combat power ratio theory.
The critical component in all of these historical examples
is that combat power, although important and paramount in the
minds of the commander, is just one of many factors in the
overall equation of successful combat. Dupuy and his
associates developed a list of seventy-three such factors that
affect combat. Some of these factors include: leadership,
training, morale, experience, and technology. Since
incorporating all seventy-three of these factors into any
decision aid would be extremely difficult, the decision aid
developed in this thesis uses only the four factors found in
the Unit Status Report (USR) . This monthly report requires
the commander to evaluate the unit in four major areas. These
are: personnel, equipment readiness, equipment on hand, and
training. Each commander is required to submit this evalua-
tion to the next higher level of command.
C. PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a
decision aid model that would provide the unit commander with
a recommended course of action. This decision aid uses the
QJM as the basis for the model. This algorithm analyzes
various external factors that would have an impact on the
battle and provides the commander with a recommended course
of action. These external factors include:
1. initial force structure of the US and Soviet forces,
2. behavioral variables,
3. intelligence about the Soviet force,
4. operational and environmental factors, and
5. current doctrine.
The results from a ground combat simulation were a key
factor in determining the force size for both the US and the
Soviet forces in which the battle would end up in a draw; this
is more commonly referred to as the combat breakpoint. This
breakpoint served as a baseline for varying the external
factors in the model to determine critical levels of these
factors that could have an important impact on the ultimate
outcome of the battle as determined by the QJM. The
components utilized in the decision aid model are factors that
could not be incorporated in the computer simulation. The
purpose of the decision aid was to incorporate these factors
into the model. A more detailed discussion of the method in
which these factors were incorporated into the model is
included in Chapter 4
.
II. THE JANUS COMPUTER MODEL AND THE QUANTIFIED
JUDGMENT MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Janus simulation was to simulate ground
combat between a US mechanized infantry force attacking a
Soviet motorized rifle force in defensive positions. The
simulation results were used to develop a combat breakpoint
for this particular tactical scenario that served as input to
the model used in the decision aid model.
The US and Soviet forces used in the simulation were
strictly mechanized infantry forces. Fire support, close air
support, engineer assets, and armor forces were not considered
in the simulation, since these assets will vary depending on
the tactical situation. By not varying the force, the model
can make predictions about a mechanized infantry unit that is
not task organized.
A force is considered task organized when the unit has
forces attached to it that are not part of the same
headquarters. For example, a mechanized infantry battalion
is considered task organized when it has an armor company
attached to it. The way in which units are task organized
depends on the mission, type of enemy threat, the type of
terrain, and the assets available to the force commander.
B. JANUS COMPUTER MODEL
Janus, developed in 1983 by the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command Systems Analysis Activity, is used exten-
sively throughout the US Army as its primary ground combat
model. New versions of the model are being developed, and
the model is considered by the Army modeling community to be
one of the best ground combat simulation models available.
Janus is a player interactive, high resolution, stochastic
ground combat simulation [Ref 6, page 6]. The model is
interactive in that the player specifies the actions of the
forces portrayed in the simulation. It is high resolution in
that the model depicts detailed interactions of the individual
combatants or weapon systems with none of the forces being
aggregated into larger units. [Ref 6, page 6] It is
stochastic in that the laws of probability determine whether
engagements between two elements occur and the outcomes of
those engagements.
The actions of the simulation are displayed on a high
resolution monitor thus enabling the player to see the
movement of the forces. The terrain resolution is an accurate
portrayal of the terrain selected for the model making it
easier for the player to deploy forces and select routes of
movement.
At the end of each simulation, the player obtains a
detailed printout of all actions that occurred during the
simulation. These printouts enable the user to examine
critical battle information, such as the time at which each
combatant system is detected, the time at which each system
fired, the time at which each system killed another system,
and the time at which the system was killed.
In summary, the Janus model was selected for use in this
thesis due to its wide acceptance throughout the Army, and
its ability to display critical battle information.
Additionally, the Janus model is highly flexible, thus making
it easy for the user to tailor the model to accommodate any
type of unit.
C. QUANTIFIED JUDGMENT MODEL
The QJM uses formulas developed from historical combat
data to compare the relative combat power between two forces.
The major factors in the QJM are those variables that affect
the weapon systems' effectiveness and how well the weapon
systems are employed. These formulas were developed from
historical combat data compiled from over 200 battles that
occurred between 1915 and 1973. The QJM also has the
capability of incorporating what Dupuy calls "intangible
variables" such as leadership, training, and morale. [Ref 1,
page 280] The QJM is also unique in that it has the ability
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to incorporate behavioral variables such as surprise and
combat effectiveness [Ref 2 ,page 95].
The QJM examines and analyzes three major aspects of
battles:
1. the extent to which each side is able to accomplish its
assigned mission,
2. the ability of each side to gain or hold ground, and
3. the ability of a unit to accomplish its assigned mission
while simultaneously being able to gain or hold key
terrain. [Ref 2, page 42]
Dupuy claims that the QJM is one of the most accurate
models available in predicting the outcomes of battles. For
example, it compared sixty engagements that occurred in Italy
between 1943 and 1944. In these sixty engagements, the QJM
was able to predict the outcome of each battle with a high
degree of accuracy. This same data served as input to a
different theater level model that is used and widely accepted
throughout the Army. This theater level model could not
predict the outcomes of these same battles with any degree of
accuracy. Dupuy and his associates have analyzed many other
battles that consisted of different types of forces which were
operating in different types of theaters. The results of
these battles determined by the QJM were similar to results
predicted by the QJM on the battles fought in Italy. [Ref 2,
page 57] These tests indicate the validity and accuracy of
the model.
1. Combat Power Equation
When analyzing the strength of an opposing force, the
commander must consider a myriad of factors other than just
the size of the force. In Dupuy's QJM, the combat power of
the force has the capability of including all of these
factors. The combat power of a force takes into account the
strength of the force, any operational and environmental
factors that may have an impact on the force, and the quality
of the troops. Dupuy's combat power equation is;
P = S X OE X Q
where,
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength (number and type of vehicles and
personnel
)
OE = operational and environmental factors
Q = quality of the troops.
2. Force Strength Equation
The force strength equation takes into account a
multitude of factors when determining the strength of a force.
It analyzes the characteristics of each weapon system, the
number of each type of weapon system, and any environmental
factors that may have an impact on each weapon system [Ref 2,
page 43] . Force strength is calculated as follows;
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Force Strength (US) : S^j^ = S-^^ ^ (n- x OLI. x V.)
Force Strength (Soviet): S^^^.^^ =1
,=5,6 ("i ^ 0^1. x V.)
where,
S = Force Strength
n = the total number of each weapon system
OLI = Operational Lethality Index of each weapon system
V = environmental effects on the weapon system
i = weapon system index of summation
1 = Bradley Fighting Vehicle (US)
2 = Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (US)
3 = Improved Tow Vehicle (US)
4 = Dragon (US)
5 = BMP (Soviet)
6 = RPG-7 (Soviet)
.
D. FORCE STRUCTURE
The initial force structure of the simulation consisted
of a US mechanized infantry battalion attacking a Soviet
motorized rifle company in prepared defensive positions. The
US mechanized infantry battalion was organized into four
companies. The battalion contained a total of fifty-five
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) , six Cavalry Fighting
Vehicles (CFVs) , twelve Improved Tow Vehicles (ITVs) , and
thirty-six medium antitank weapons (Dragons) that were mounted
on the BFVs.
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The initial Soviet force consisted of one motorized rifle
company. The company had a total of ten amphibious armored
infantry combat vehicles (BMPs) and eleven antitank grenade
launchers (RPG-7s) . Since the Soviet force was in a defensive
posture, the RPG-7s were employed independently of the BMPs.
1. Brief Description of the Scenario
The simulation consisted of a US mechanized force
attacking a Soviet motorized rifle force. The Soviet forces
were in prepared defensive positions, while the US forces
conducted a deliberate attack on the Soviet forces.
Three different scenarios were conducted in the
simulation. Initially, a US mechanized infantry battalion
attacked a Soviet motorized rifle company. In the second
scenario, the US forces were depleted by a total of one
company's worth of weapon systems, and the equivalent strength
was added to the Soviet force. In the third scenario, the US
forces were depleted by an additional company's worth of
weapon systems, and the equivalent strength was added to the
Soviet force. A more detailed description of the tactical




The Operational Lethality Index (OLI) is used in QJM
as a measure of a weapon system effectiveness. Table 1
provides the OLIs used to calculate the force structure for
each scenario in the simulation.
TABLE 1. OPERATIONAL LETHALITY INDEX SCORES^
Bradley Fighting Vehicle 25.9
Cavalry Fighting Vehicle 28.5





The OLI scores served as input to the force strength
equation. Based on the OLI scores and the number of weapon
systems for both the US and Soviet forces, force strength was
calculated.
3 Force Strength Calculations
The key in each of the scenarios was to insure that
total force strength remained constant. This insured that a
valid combat breakpoint was determined for this particular
"^The OLI scores used in this model were obtained in a
telephone conversation with Dr. Wally Chandler of the Army's
Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland. The CAA
is responsible for developing and maintaining all of theater
level models used throughout the Army.
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tactical scenario. Based on the number of weapon systems in
the first scenario, a total force strength was determined.
The total force strength for the first scenario based on the
OLIs and the total number of weapon systems was 2425.7. For
example, in the first scenario the US forces had a total force
strength of 2085.1, while the Soviets had a total force
strength of 340.6. Environmental factors could not be varied
in the Janus model, therefore, these factors were not
considered in the force strength equation.
The purpose for varying the force strength was to
determine the combat breakpoint for this particular tactical
scenario. Starting with a scenario that gave the US forces
an almost six to one force strength ratio over the Soviet
forces and ending with a scenario that had the US forces
outnumbered in terms of force strength, a combat breakpoint
for this particular scenario was determined. The derivation
and calculation of this breakpoint is discussed in Chapter 3.
A linear program (Appendix p^) was used to determine
the number of weapon systems that each side would have in each
scenario. The linear program maximizes the number of weapon
systems based on the OLI of each weapon system. The
constraint equations set lower and upper limits for each type
of weapon system for each scenario. This insured that each
14
side maintained a proper combination of weapon systems in
accordance with approved doctrine.
In all three of the simulation scenarios, the total
force structure remained constant. However, the US and Soviet
forces had different force structures in each scenario. For
example, in the first scenario the US forces had fifty-five
BFVs, six CFVs, twelve ITVs, and thirty-six Dragons. In the
second scenario, the US forces had forty-two BFVs, six CFVs,
nine ITVs, and twenty-seven Dragons. Based on the force
strength equation, the Soviet forces increased from ten BMPs
and eleven RPG-7s in the first scenario to twenty-four BMPs
and twenty RPG-7s in the second scenario. This insured that
the sum of the total force strength remained constant and that
each side maintained an appropriate number of weapon systems.
Chapter 3 discusses in greater detail the way in which weapon
systems were removed from the US force, and the way in which
weapon systems were added to the Soviet force.
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III. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The simulation consisted of a US mechanized infantry force
attacking a Soviet motorized rifle force in three different
scenarios. Each scenario varied the size of the US and Soviet
forces for the purpose of determining the combat breakpoint
for this given scenario. The combat breakpoint is the point
in which parity exists between the two forces and is the point
at which the battle would theoretically end in a draw. A draw
is defined as the point at which neither side has an advantage
over the other side, or it is the point that each side has an
equal chance of winning the battle. The output from each
trial run was analyzed and a combat breakpoint was determined
based on the results of the simulations. This breakpoint
served as the critical component in the development of the
decision aid.
The only factor varied in the simulation was the size of
the force. Each scenario used the same terrain and all of
the US weapon systems had the same movement routes for each
scenario. Holding all of the factors, except the size of the
force, constant insured that the breakpoint was a function of
the force size and that other factors did not influence the
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the force size and that other factors did not influence the
calculated breakpoint.
B. TERRAIN
The Janus computer model has the capability of displaying
and using terrain from different parts of the world.
Simulated terrain representative of the US Army's National
Training Center (NTC) located at Fort Irwin, California was
used for the entire simulation. There were three major
reasons for selecting the NTC terrain. The first reason was
because of the author's familiarity with the location. This
familiarity with the terrain made it easier to select a
suitable location for a US mechanized force to operate. The
second reason was that the terrain selected was very open with
a few rolling hills, thus it did not provide the attacking or
the defending force with any particular tactical advantage.
This helped insure that the terrain limited any bias. However,
any bias caused by the terrain was factored out by determining
the operational and environmental factors in the QJM [Ref 1,
page 87]. The third reason was that the area selected
provided enough space for a US mechanized infantry battalion
to conduct offensive operations, thus the terrain did not
restrict the force's movement and enabled the US force to be
deployed tactically without any restrictions.
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C. TACTICAL SCENARIO
The objective of the US force was to gain and seize the
key terrain occupied by the Soviet force. The US forces did
not have any type of follow-on mission and would receive
instructions from the next higher level of command once it
seized the key terrain.
Initially, the US forces were deployed with three
mechanized infantry companies abreast and one mechanized
infantry company following the center company as a reserve
force. The main attack occurred in the center company's
sector; therefore, the center company was weighted heavier in
terms of weapon systems than the other companies. The mission
of the companies on the flanks was to support the main attack
in the center sector, while the company following in reserve
was prepared to support the main attack.
The mission and the manner in which the US forces were
deployed for all three of the scenarios were the same. In
order to keep the same tactical configuration, weapon systems
were removed from each of the mechanized infantry companies
when the size of the force was varied. For example, in the
first scenario the center company had sixteen BFVs, and each
of the other three companies had thirteen BFVs. In the second
scenario, the center company had thirteen BFVs, while the
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other companies had nine BFVs. The number of CFVs remained
the same for all three scenarios, and each of the companies
that were deployed on line had one of their ITVs removed
between scenarios. The ITVs were not deployed with the
company that was in reserve.
Initially, the Soviet force consisted of a motorized rifle
company that was deployed on a key piece of terrain that con-
trolled the movement into and out of the valley in which the
operation took place. In the first scenario, the Soviet force
consisted of ten BMPs and eleven RPG-7s. In the second
scenario, the Soviet force was organized into two motorized
rifle companies with twelve BMPs and ten RPG-7s each. In the
final scenario, the Soviet forces were organized into three
motorized rifle companies that consisted of twelve BMPs and
eleven RPG-7s each.
D. SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION
Once the size and type of force for each tactical scenario
was specified, it was necessary to calculate the number of
times that each trial should be run to determine the combat
breakpoint with statistical significance. Key in determining
the number of runs was establishing a level of significance.
Initially, an alpha level of 0.20 was selected for the sample
size calculation. This means that there is a 0.20 probability
of rejecting a true test hypothesis. An alpha level of 0.20
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is commonly used and accepted in the Army for test and
evaluation [Ref 10] . This level was used in this model since
an accepted alpha level for combat models could not be found.
The random variable measured is the number of vehicles
killed in each trial run. Based on historical data from the
Janus model, it was assumed that this random variable was
normally distributed. Since the exact value for the standard
deviation was not known, the t-distribution was used.




s = Estimate of Standard Deviation
'ti-aipha/2 = "the theoretical t statistic
error = error term used to calculate sample size.
In order to determine the size of the sample, it was
necessary to obtain an estimate of the standard deviation and
determine what would be an acceptable error term. The
standard deviation used in the formula was obtained from
historical data of combat simulations with similar tactical
scenarios. The value of the standard deviation used was
20
1.333, and it was determined that an error of 0.5 would be
acceptable for this simulation.^
Once an estimate for the standard deviation was obtained
and a value for the error term established, the number of runs
for each scenario could be calculated. Table 2 depicts the
























Column one is the value for the number of trial runs.
Column two provides respective t statistics and the final
column provides a calculated value of n using the sample size
formula described above.
^This information was obtained in a conversation with
Major Hirome Fujio of TRAC Monterey.
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In order to obtain a value for the sample size, the value
in the last column is compared with the value in the first
column. The sample size is determined by selecting a value
of n that had the smallest absolute value difference between
the values in the first and last column. Based on these
calculations, a sample size of thirteen was selected. [Ref 11]
E. ASSUMPTIONS IN THE SIMULATION
Several key assumptions were made in developing each
scenario and in running each trial of the simulation. Listed
below are some of the assumptions made in analyzing the
results of the simulation and in developing the decision aid.
1. The computer simulation did not incorporate what Dupuy
called "intangible factors" in the model, such as
leadership, training, morale, and experience.
2. An alpha level of 0.20 is a valid alpha level for this
combat simulation.
3. Janus is an accurate portrayal of actual combat.
4. The OLI figures obtained from the CAA are valid.
F. SIMULATION RESULTS
Each scenario was composed of thirteen different trial
runs. The results for each of the runs were analyzed to
determine the combat breakpoint. Table 3 depicts the 95%
confidence interval for the number of weapon systems killed
in each scenario.
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TABLE 3. 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL FOR EXPECTED NUMBER OF
WEAPON SYSTEMS KILLED




The values for the upper and lower bounds varied from
scenario to scenario. Since the forces were varied on both
sides between scenarios, the number of weapon systems killed
was not the same for each scenario. These confidence interval
figures are not used in the calculation of the breakpoint but
serve as an indication of the consistency of the simulation.
1 . Initial Force Ratio
The first step in analyzing the results of the
simulation was to calculate the initial force ratio (IFR).
This ratio is a comparison of the initial force strength of
the US forces divided by the initial force strength of the
Soviet forces for each scenario. The following is the formula
that is used to calculate the IFR;
IFR = S ( US )/S( Soviet)
where,
S(US) = force strength of the US forces
S( Soviet) = force strength of the Soviet forces.
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2. Force Exchange Ratio
The force exchange ratio (FER) could not be calculated
until each of the trials in each scenario was complete. This
ratio compares the percentage of US weapon systems lost to the
percentage of Soviet weapon systems lost. The following
formula is used to calculate the FER;
FER = Soviet weapon systems killed/ US weapon systems killed
S ( Soviet )/S( US)
Table 4 provides a comparison between the IFR and the
FER for each scenario and was used to determine the combat
breakpoint for this particular tactical situation.
TABLE 4. IFR AND FER COMPARISON




Based on the definition of the FER, if there was a
one for one exchange in terms of weapon systems, the IFR would
equal the FER. Therefore, based on the values listed in Table
4, the US forces killed a higher percentage of weapon systems
in the first scenario; however, the Soviets killed a higher
percentage of weapon systems in the second and third
scenarios.
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G. COMBAT BREAKPOINT CALCULATIONS
The results of the simulation were analyzed in order to
determine the combat breakpoint for this particular tactical
situation. Based on the data in Table 4, it was estimated
that the combat breakpoint occurred when the US forces had a
1.5 IFR over the Soviet forces. This combat breakpoint is
the point in which parity exists between the two forces and
is the point at which the battle would theoretically end in
a draw.
The value of 1.5 to 1 is a reasonable value for the combat
breakpoint for this scenario. If other assets such as, close
air support, fire support, mines, and engineer assets were
used in the simulation the breakpoint would have been higher.
This is because these assets provide the defending force a
tactical advantage and serve as a combat multiplier for the
defending forces.
H. RANGE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS VALUES
The combat effectiveness (CE) of a force is a comparison
of the degree to which the troop quality variable affects the
outcome of a battle. The CE of a force is simply the ratio
of the actual combat results to the theoretical combat
results. The theoretical combat power of a force is a
function of the force strength and the operational and
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environmental factors. The theoretical combat power equation
is presented below:
Theoretical Combat Power (P') P ' = S x OE
where,
S = force strength
OE = operational and environmental factors.
The actual battle results examines three factors:
1. the force's ability to accomplish the mission,
2. the ability to gain or hold ground, and
3. the effectiveness of a force when casualties occur.
Presented below is the actual battle results equation:
Actual Battle Results (R) R=M+G+C
where,
M = ability to accomplish the mission
G = ability to gain or hold ground
C = effectiveness of the force when casualties occur.
In the QJM the actual battle results is based on
historical data and take into account Dupuy's Q factor which
includes leadership, training, morale, and experience. Since
historical data was not available for any of the scenarios
used in this thesis, the equation used for the actual battle
results was the combat power equation. This equation was used
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since it took into account the troop quality factors that were
used in developing the decision aid model
.
In order for a force to have an advantage over an opposing
force, the P value must be greater than one; therefore, parity
between the two forces exists when the ratio of P values
equals one. In this particular tactical scenario, it was
determined that parity existed between the two forces when the
US forces had a 1.5 IFR advantage over the Soviet forces. The
simulation provided results for the theoretical combat power
of the forces; therefore, based on the theoretical combat
power equation, it was determined that the operational and
environmental factors that affected this simulation were equal
to 0.6667. This value was determined by setting the
theoretical combat power equal to one and solving the equation
for the operational and environmental factor. This factor
took into account the fact that the US force was attacking the
Soviet force. This made the theoretical combat power of the
US and Soviet forces equal to one when parity existed between
the two forces.
The next step was to actually calculate the range of
values of the CE of the two forces. A range of values for
the CE is established by using the combat power equation and
substituting the CE value for the Q value in the equation.
Dupuy, in his book Understanding War , made this substitution.
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because he stated that the CE value takes into account the non
tactical characteristics of a force [Ref 1, page 282]. The
revised combat power equation used in determining the range
of CE values is;
P(US) = S(US) X OE(US) X CE(US)
P( Soviets) = S( Soviets) x 0E( Soviets) x CE( Soviets)
where,
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength
OE = operational and environmental factors
CE = combat effectiveness of the force.
The range of CE(US) values was determined by calculating
the values needed in order for parity to exist between the US
and Soviet forces. By performing these calculations, an upper
and lower limit for the CE(US) was established. This range
of values was calculated by setting the value of P equal to
1, the value of OE equal to 0.6667, and varying the value of
S based on the IFRs used in the different scenarios. For
example, in the first scenario, the IFR was equal to 5.95;
therefore, the CE(US) was determined to be 0.2523 for the
first scenario. Using the same procedure, the CE(US) value
for the third scenario was equal to 1.656. This was based on
the IFR equal to 0.907 in the third scenario. Based on the
definition of the CE, the range of values for the CE( Soviets)
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is the reciprocal of the CE(US). The range of the CE values
calculated for both forces is well within the range of values
for the CE calculated by Dupuy and his associates based on
historical data [Ref 1, page 226].
This range of CE values, which established upper and lower
bounds for the troop quality factors, was used in developing
the decision aid model. Chapter 4 explains how the troop
quality factors were broken down and applied to the decision
aid model.
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IV. DECISION AID MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the days of Clausewitz and the Napoleonic Wars, the
modern battlefield has grown in complexity with an increase
in the number of functions a commander must perform while
executing increasingly expanding command responsibilities.
During Clausewitz 's time a commander was responsible for about
ten functions on the battlefield. [Ref 13, page 29]
The battlefield of today is much more complex. With the
advent of the Airland Battle Doctrine, the commander is
responsible for more than thirty different functions. For
example, during the early 1800 's, the maneuver forces that a
commander was responsible for included only infantry and
cavalry troops. Today, the maneuver forces that a commander
is responsible for include infantry, armor, cavalry, and
attack helicopters. In the early 1800 's, the major areas of
responsibility included maneuver forces, fire supports assets,
engineers, intelligence, and logistical assets. In addition
to each of these major areas expanding, today's commander is
responsible for tactical air support, air defense artillery,
and electronic warfare. [Ref 13, page 29]
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In addition to the increasing complexity of the modern
battlefield, the physical area of the battlefield has
increased dramatically since the days of the Civil War.
During the Civil War, a deployed force of 100,000 men would
occupy an area of about twenty-six square kilometers. The
same force covered a front of about 8.6 kilometers and
extended to a depth of about 3.0 kilometers. The same
commander today is doctrinally responsible for about 4,000
square kilometers. This force covers a front of about fifty-
seven kilometers and extends back to a depth of about seventy
kilometers. [Ref 2, page 28]
In addition to the increased responsibility of the
commander and size of the battlefield, the commander now has
access to enormous quantities of information for analysis and
evaluation. This information, which originates from numerous
sources, both on and off of the battlefield, requires
evaluation and dissemination in a timely manner in order to
be of maximum value. Thus, the commander must now make not
only correct decisions, but they must be made with greater
expedience. Delaying on the modern battlefield could mean the
difference between victory and defeat.
The requirement to process tremendous amounts of
information in a timely manner has led to the development and
proliferation of battlefield decision aids. The decision aid
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model developed here rapidly provides the commander with a
predictive indication of unit performance during an engagement
and thus, an indication regarding the probable outcome of the
battle. This model, however, like any decision aid, is not
intended to provide the definitive tactical solution nor does
it make the decision for the commander. That ultimate
decision, as always, rests with the commander.
The specific purpose of this decision aid model was to
analyze information available to the commander and provide
some type of quantitative measure that will be of assistance
in selecting a course of action. This decision aid will
assist the commander by enabling him to concentrate available
combat power against the enemy at the proper time.
The component elements of this decision aid model included
those areas evaluated by the commander in the Unit Status
Report (USR) . The USR is a monthly evaluation made by the
unit commander that provides an overall unit rating based on
four critical areas. These areas include personnel,
equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training.
The next step was to establish a relationship between the
QJM and the USR. In Dupuy ' s QJM, he refers to certain charac-
teristic of a unit as "intangible factors". Dupuy states that
these "intangible factors" are non tactical variables that
have an impact on a unit's ability to perform in combat. For
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the purposes of this decision aid model, these "intangible
factors" are the individual components of the USR. These
components were varied in the QJM and serve as the basis for
development of the model.
The decision aid model examines the commander's possible
courses of action and provides a recommendation as to which
course of action should be selected. Several different
sources serve as input into the model and are evaluated in
developing the recommended course of action. The decision
aid model uses the following factors as input variables:
1. US and Soviet Initial Force Strength.
2. Operational and environmental factors such as; terrain,
combat posture, and mobility.
3. Current US and Soviet doctrine concerning offensive and
defensive tactics.
4. Areas evaluated in the USR.
5. Intelligence about the Soviet forces.
Each of the factors are considered by the decision aid
model and a recommended course of action is developed. The
algorithm used in developing a recommended course of action
consists of Dupuy's revised combat power equation with the
areas evaluated in the USR serving as the "intangible
factors"
.
The commander then considers the recommended course of
action and makes a decision based on endogenous and exogenous
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variables that might affect the situation. The endogenous
variables might include the commander's experience,
intuition, training, and personal bias. The exogenous
variables might include; staff officer recommendations,
changes in intelligence, and restrictions placed on the force.
Based on the recommended course of action from the decision
aid and the variables affecting the different courses of
action, the commander can now optimize the probability of
taking the correct course of action.
B. UNIT STATUS REPORT
The factors evaluated by the unit commander in the Unit
Status Report (USR) were used in developing the decision aid.
These factors include personnel, equipment readiness,
equipment on hand, and training. The USR requires commanders
to evaluate their unit each month in these areas. This
evaluation predicts how well a unit will perform its wartime
mission based on an evaluation of the four major areas
described above.
The rating scheme for the USR consists of a rating in each
of the four major areas. A CI rating is the highest possible
rating that a unit can receive in each category, and a C5
rating is the lowest possible rating that a unit can receive.
For the purpose of this thesis, only CI - C3 ratings were
examined. This is because C4 and C5 ratings are rarely given,
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and a C5 rating can only be given to a unit with Department
of the Army approval.
1. Personnel
The personnel evaluation is calculated by comparing
the available strength, available military occupational skill
(MOS) trained strength, and the available senior grade
strength. An MOS is the soldier's area of technical
expertise. Army Regulation 220-1 states that an overall
personnel rating is assigned to a unit based on the lowest
rating assigned to any one of the three areas described above
[Ref 14 ; page 15]
.
The available personnel strength is determined by
comparing the number of personnel that a unit is capable of
deploying against the number of personnel that a unit is
required to have based on the unit's table of organization
and equipment (TOE) . This strength is calculated by using
the following formula;
Available personnel strength = assigned strength
required strength .
Table 5 describes how the rating is determined for the
available personnel strength.
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TABLE 5. RATING FOR AVAILABLE PERSONNEL STRENGTH




The available MOS trained strength is a comparison of
the number of available MOS trained personnel with the number
of required MOS trained personnel. The comparison includes
both officers and enlisted personnel. An MOS trained officer
must have completed the officer basic course and receive his
commander's recommendation regarding combat skills. An
enlisted person is considered MOS trained if serving in either
his primary or secondary MOS. These combat skills are
individual skills and are not a measure of how well an officer
or enlisted person will perform in the unit collectively. The
following formula is used to determine the available MOS
trained personnel;
Available trained MOS personnel = Avail. MOS trained strength
Required strength
The available senior grade compares the number of
officers and non commissioned officers that a unit has with
the number of officers and non commissioned officers that a
unit is required to have according to the unit's TOE. The
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formula listed below is used to compute the available senior
grade;
Available Senior Grade = Available Senior Grade
Required Senior Grade.
Table 6 is used to determine the rating for the
available trained MOS personnel and the available senior
grade.
TABLE 6. RATING FOR AVAILABLE MOS TRAINED PERSONNEL
AND AVAILABLE SENIOR GRADE PERSONNEL




Based on the evaluation of each of the personnel
areas, an overall rating is assigned to the personnel
category. This rating is determined by the lowest rating in
any one of the personnel areas examined.
2 . Equipment on Hand
An overall rating is given to unit by comparing the
amount of equipment that a unit has on hand with the amount
of equipment that a unit is required to have on hand in order
to perform its wartime mission. Each item that is identified
in the unit's TOE as critical is evaluated and assigned a
numeric value based on the percentage of equipment that the
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unit has on hand. Table 7 describes how the numeric values
are assigned to each item in the TOE.
TABLE 7. EQUIPMENT ON HAND EVALUATION





Based on this evaluation, the following calculations
are made where,
A = (equipment with numeric value of 1) x 1
B = (equipment with numeric value of 2) x 2
C = (equipment with numeric value of 3) x 3
D = (equipment with numeric value of 4) x 4
E = (A+B+C+D)/ total amount of equipment
evaluated.
E is then used to determine the equipment on hand rating.
Table 8 lists the criteria for the equipment on hand rating.
TABLE 8 EQUIPMENT ON HAND C RATING
C rating Criteria (final value calculated)
1 < 1.30
2 1.31-2.20
3 2.21 - 3.10
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3. Equipment Readiness
This rating is determined by computing the total
number of days that a unit's equipment is capable of
performing its mission and dividing this number by the total
number of equipment days in the evaluation period. Table 9
lists the rating criteria for equipment readiness.
TABLE 9. EQUIPMENT READINESS RATING







The last area involves an overall evaluation of the
unit's training status. The evaluation is based on the unit's
ability to perform its wartime mission. The standard used is
the Mission Essential Task List (METL) that describes the
unit's wartime mission. The METL is developed by the unit
commander and is submitted to the next higher level of command
for approval. The training rating is based on the commander's
estimation of the number of days that the unit will require
in order to be trained to the standards described in the METL.
These training standards are a measure of unit's training
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status as a whole. Table 10 describes the criteria used to
assign a rating to training.
TABLE 10. TRAINING RATING





5. Overall Unit Rating
The unit is assigned an overall rating based on the
ratings of the four areas described above. Each area is
considered to have the same amount of weight in determining
the overall rating. The unit's overall rating is equal to
the lowest rating given to one of the four areas. For
example, if a unit has a C2 rating in personnel and equipment
on hand, a C3 rating in equipment readiness, and a CI rating
in training, the unit is assigned an overall rating of C3
.
For the purpose of developing a decision aid model, an overall
rating was not assigned to the unit. Each of the four areas
are considered independently in the model, because results
from one of the four areas evaluated did not serve as input
to any of the other areas evaluated.
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C. DECISION AID MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In developing the decision aid model, all of the factors
evaluated in the USR were weighted equally as consistent with
Army Regulation 220-1. This, fortunately, made it easier to
develop a decision aid model that took Dupuy ' s Q factor into
account, because it reduced the number of total combinations
in the model.
It was necessary to develop a baseline for the decision
aid model. It was determined that the baseline case would
occur at the combat breakpoint or when the US forces had a
1.5 IFR over the Soviet forces. This baseline case occurred
when the US forces had a C2 rating in personnel, equipment on
hand, equipment readiness, and training. This baseline was
established because, it is extremely rare that a unit receives
a CI rating in all of the areas evaluated. Also, a C2 unit
is typical of the average unit. This baseline case serves as
a means to compare all of the different possible cases.
The next step in developing the decision aid model was to
examine the extreme cases. One extreme occurs when a unit is
rated a CI in all areas, and the other extreme occurs when the
unit is rated a C3 in all areas. For the case when a unit is
rated a CI in all areas, it was determined that the US forces
needed only a 0.91 IFR over the Soviet forces in order to
achieve parity. However, in the case where the unit is rated
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a C3 in all of all areas, it was determined that the US forces
needed a 5.95 IFR over the Soviet forces in order to achieve
parity.
Since each factor is equally weighted and the IFRs for the
two extreme cases were established, the value for each of the
four areas could be determined. This value for each area was
determined using the revised combat power equation described
in Chapter 3. Key in calculating these values was the
assumption that the four areas are independent of each other.
This meant that the rating that a unit received in personnel
had no impact on the rating that a unit received in equipment
on hand. Recall from Chapter 3, the revised combat power
equation is;
P = S X OE X CE
where,
P = combat power of the force
S = force strength
OE = operational and environmental factors
CE = combat effectiveness of the force.
For the purposes of the decision aid model, the CE value
in the revised combat power equation is composed of four
different variables. These four variables are personnel,
equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. The OE
value was described in Chapter 3 and was determined to be
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equal to 0.6667. If a unit is to achieve parity in combat
the P value in the revised combat power equation must equal
one; therefore, based on the revised combat power equation
with P equal one and OE equal 0.6667, a value for each one of
the four areas evaluated in the USR could be determined.
Using the revised combat power equation, Table 11 lists the
values for each rating that would be used in the revised
combat power equation.
TABLE 11. REVISED COMBAT POWER EQUATION VALUES




These values were used in the revised combat power
equation to determine what the IFR for the US forces must
equal in order for the US forces to achieve parity with the
Soviet forces on the battlefield. For example, if the US
forces had a Cl rating in training, personnel and equipment
on hand and a C3 rating in equipment readiness, the US forces
would need a 1.45 IFR over the Soviet forces in order to
achieve parity on the battlefield. Critical in the
calculation of these values is that the US forces were
attacking a defending Soviet force.
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since each of the factors are equally weighted, order did
not have an impact on the IFR determined in the revised combat
power equation. For example, if a unit had a C2 rating in
training, personnel, and equipment readiness and a CI rating
in equipment on hand, it would need the same IFR to achieve
parity as a unit that had a C2 rating in equipment on hand,
equipment readiness, and personnel and a CI rating in
training. A computer program (Appendix B ) was written to
determine the IFR that the US forces must have in order to
achieve parity with the Soviet forces on the battlefield. The
program uses the rating of each of the four areas evaluated
in the USR to determine the IFR needed to achieve parity.
Table 12 lists the IFR needed to achieve parity based on all
possible rating combinations.




12 2 2 1.321113 1.45
2 2 2 2 1.50
112 3 1.65
12 2 3 1.87
2 2 2 3 2.12
113 3 2.33
12 3 3 2.64
2 2 3 3 2.99
13 3 3 3.72
2 3 3 3 4.22
3 3 3 3 5.95
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Listed below are two examples that illustrate the use of
Table 12.
1. Example 1
A mechanized infantry battalion is preparing their
monthly USR. The battalion executive officer has the overall
responsibility of consolidating all of the information and
preparing the report. He receives the following information
from his staff officers. In the area of personnel, it is
reported to him that the unit has 93% of the assigned
personnel strength, 87% of the available MOS trained
personnel, and 83% of the available senior grade personnel.
Equipment on hand is reported to have a value of 2.57.
Equipment readiness is reported to be 87% for the rating
period, and the commander feels that the unit needs 17 days
to train in order to be able to perform all of their METL
tasks to standards.
Based on this information, the battalion executive
officer determines that the unit will receive a C2 rating in
the personnel area, a C3 rating in the equipment on hand area,
a C2 rating in the equipment readiness area, and a C2 rating
in the training area. Using Table 12 and the evaluated status
in the USR, this unit will need a 2.12 IFR over the Soviets
in order to achieve parity on the battlefield.
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2 . Example 2
The following month this same unit received some new
equipment to replace some of the older equipment on hand and
to replace some of the existing shortages. Based on this
information, the unit improved its rating in the equipment
readiness area from a C2 to a CI and improved its rating in
the equipment on hand area from a C3 to a CI. Personnel and
training both remained C2 for the rating period. Based on
this information and the values listed in Table 12, the unit
will need a 1.17 IFR over the Soviets in order to achieve
parity on the battlefield.
D . SUMMARY
In developing the decision aid model, there are several
critical assumptions made in the model development. These
assumptions include:
1. Independence of each of the factors evaluated in the
USR.
2. C2 rated unit served as the baseline unit.
3. Each of the factors is considered separately and an
overall unit rating is not assigned.
The validity of these assumptions is not the critical
component of the model. The key is the methodology used in
developing the model. Different assumptions can be made and
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used to develop different results; however, the concepts and
equations developed in this model can be tailored to adapt to
any type of tactical situation and assumptions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the days of the ancient Chinese warriors, attempts
have been made to determine what type of tactical situation
must exist in order for a commander to attack a defending
force. Sun Tzu stated that if the following conditions exist,
the force commander should conduct the following type of
operations:
1. If you outnumber the enemy ten to one, your objective
is to surround the enemy.
2. When you outnumber the enemy five to one, you attack
the enemy.
3. If the attacking force has double the strength of the
enemy, the objective is to divide the enemy.
4. If the forces are equal, you may engage the enemy. [Ref
15, page 79-80]
Sun Tzu's strategy only addressed the numerical advantage
that one force had over another force. His strategy did not
consider other factors that could influence the outcome of the
battle. These factors include variables such as quality of
leadership, state of training, morale, and the experience of
the force.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a decision aid
model that considers factors other than just the strength of
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a force compared to the strength of another force. The
factors examined included the effects of terrain, combat
posture, and mobility of a force, and the effects that non
tactical variables have on a battle.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The decision aid model uses the theoretical combat power
equation formulated by Dupuy and his associates. The model
examines factors such as force strength, intelligence,
terrain, environmental factors, and "intangible factors" in
developing a recommended course of action.
Dupuy ' s QJM is the critical component of the decision aid
model. Chapter Two explained how the QJM was developed and
how this model relies on historical data instead of
projections of future weapon systems. The validity of the
QJM has, in the past, been verified by comparing the results
achieved with the QJM with the results of actual battles.
The next phase consisted of a computer simulation, with
results from this simulation being used in the development of
a combat breakpoint. This breakpoint is a key factor in the
development of the decision aid model.
The final phase is the actual development of the decision
aid model. The decision aid model consists of the results of
the simulation and what effects the factors such as personnel,
equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training would
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have on the results. The model thus provides the commander
with a recommended course of action.
The simulation used only one type of tactical situation,
and several assumptions were made in the development of the
model. The validity of the assumptions and the type of
tactical situation are not the primary focus. The primary
focus is the methodology used in developing the equations and
model used in determining a recommended course of action. The
tactical situation can change and different assumptions will
produce different results. However, the methods used to
obtain the results remain the same. The framework and
foundations have been laid for further development of this
model as applicable to any type of tactical situation.
The model developed here provides the commander with a
recommended course of action. As mentioned earlier, the com-
mander can accept or reject the recommended course of action
based on other factors that might affect his decision. The
"intangible factors" used in the model consists of a system
that the Army currently uses and did not require that a new
evaluation system be developed in order to serve as input for
the model.
The importance of using historical data to develop a model
cannot be overemphasized. As Dupuy mentioned, "military
history is the laboratory for the soldier" [Ref 1, page xxii] .
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The importance of history on the battlefield can be summed up
by a quote made by General George S. Patton in a letter to his
son that states: "To be a successful soldier you must know
history. What you must know is how man reacts. Weapons
change but man who uses them changes not at all. To win
battles you do not beat weapons - you beat the soul of man of
the enemy man." [Ref 16, page 791] The QJM is a model that
considers the historical aspect; therefore, this was a major
reason for its selection as the model that was incorporated
into the decision aid.
C. RECOMMENDED RESEARCH
This thesis covered only a small portion in the area of
decision aid models. Several other aspects of the model could




Use the same model but incorporate other factors into
the model such as indirect fire support, mines, engineer
assets, chemical warfare, and task organizing the force.
2. Develop other human factor issues that could be used in
the model . Examples include some of the seventy-three
"intangible factors" that Dupuy and his associates
developed.
3. Examine whether each of the factors in the USR should
be weighted equally. Determine the relative weights of
each of the factors in the USR. Also, examine whether
or not these factors are independent and can be treated
as independent.
4. Validate the decision aid model against actual
historical data.
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APPENDIX A LINEAR PROGRAM









n- = number and type of weapon system used in each scenario
Formulation
Maximize 1-. . OLI. n-
1 - I ,o 1 1
subject to:
OLI- n- A Lower Bound.
OLI- n- < Upper Bound-
2:.





Note: For each scenario the lower and upper bounds for each
weapon system changed.
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APPENDIX 3 COMPUTER PROGRAM
This program was written in Turbo Basic and was used to
calculate the initial force ratio needed for a unit to achieve
parity on the battlefield. The input variables were the C
















If OutputFile$ = " " then OutputFile$ = "con"








Input "Enter your C value for training "; Train
If Train = 1 then
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T = 1.134







Input "Enter your C value for equipment readiness" ; Ready
If Ready = 1 then
E = 1.134







Input "Enter your C value for equipment on hand"; OnHand
If OnHand = 1 then
H = 1.134








Input "Enter your C value for personnel" ; Pers
If Pers = 1 then
P = 1.134










Print#l, "C rating of ";Train;"in training"
Print#l, "C rating of ";Ready;"in equipment readiness"
Print#l, "C rating of "; OnHand; "in equipment on hand"
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Print#l, "C rating of ";Pers;"in personnel"
Print#l, "You will need a ";G; " to 1 initial force ratio in
order to achieve parity on the Battlefield."
INPUT "Type 1 if you wish to continue or 2 to end" ,-Mission
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